A damning Navy investigation released this week reveals that preventable human failures—not technical malfunctions—caused four catastrophic mishaps during the USS Harry S. Truman deployment, including a friendly fire incident where the cruiser USS Gettysburg shot down an American F/A-18 Super Hornet, resulting in $164 million in losses.
The December 22, 2024 friendly fire incident occurred when Gettysburg misidentified two returning F/A-18F Super Hornets as hostile anti-ship cruise missiles during operations against Houthi rebels in the Red Sea. One aircraft was hit by a Standard Missile-2 interceptor, forcing both pilots to eject safely. Investigators found the shootdown resulted from inadequate training, lack of communication between ships, failure to follow procedures, and equipment problems that were never properly reported up the chain of command.
"A lack of integrated training opportunities between USS Gettysburg and the Carrier Strike Group, lack of forceful backup on the cruiser, and lack of cohesion across the Carrier Strike Group contributed to the misidentification and subsequent engagement of the friendly aircraft."
The investigation reveals systemic problems plaguing Navy readiness after years of focusing on progressive priorities rather than combat effectiveness. Gettysburg's combat systems experienced numerous failures in the days before the incident, including degraded Link 16 tactical datalink and malfunctioning Identification Friend or Foe systems. Critically, information about these system failures was never properly communicated to commanders, leaving the crew operating with compromised situational awareness during intense combat operations.
The report documents three additional preventable losses during the deployment. In February 2025, the Truman collided with merchant vessel Besiktas-M near Port Said, Egypt—an incident investigators deemed "avoidable" due to poor navigation. In April, an F/A-18E Super Hornet and tow tractor fell off the carrier during evasive maneuvers responding to an incoming ballistic missile, caused by brake system failure and inadequate communication between bridge and flight deck personnel. In May, another Super Hornet crashed when landing due to trip wire failure, blamed on substandard maintenance practices and insufficient knowledge among arresting gear operators.
What makes these findings particularly troubling is the uniformity of the problems: leadership failures, inadequate training, broken procedures, poor maintenance practices, and low-level knowledge among crew members. These are not technical problems requiring engineering solutions—they are human failures resulting from institutional neglect of basic military readiness.
The deployment marked what Navy officials called their most intense combat since World War II, with the Truman strike group defending against sustained Houthi attacks while conducting offensive operations. Yet these preventable mishaps raise serious questions about whether years of misplaced priorities in Washington have compromised combat effectiveness when American forces face determined adversaries.
Losing three Super Hornet fighters in six months is unprecedented for modern carrier operations. Former destroyer commander Kirk Lippold noted that losing zero to one aircraft during deployment is the norm, making three losses "a huge deal." The Navy has taken unspecified "accountability actions" in response to the investigations, but the broader question remains whether Pentagon leadership focused on diversity initiatives and climate change has allowed fundamental combat readiness to deteriorate to dangerous levels, putting American sailors and aviators at unnecessary risk.
